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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
return receipt), and publish a copy of the summons and court
order in a specified paper in defendant's locale.
The appellate division validated this method of service and, for
the reasons expressed in Dobkin, held that there was no constitu-
tional impediment to this particular method of service.
These two cases illustrate the utility of CPLR 308(4) and
indicate that this subsection can be of great assistance to plaintiffs
when it is impossible to comply with the statutory methods of
service. Although the potential of CPLR 308(4) is vast, it should
be noted that, just as the particular methods of service upheld by
the instant cases depended upon the particular circumstances found
therein, devised methods of service must be tailored to the unique
factors of each individual case. The court in devising such methods
of service must always be wary of transgressing the basic require-
ments of the "due process" which must be afforded a defendant.
In both of the instant cases, strong dissenting opinions were voiced
which stated that each of the defendants had, in fact, been denied
"due process" since the methods of service devised were not likely
to afford them actual notice.85
CPLR 311: Service upon public corporation at improper address
validated.
Ware v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Au-
thority 8 6 illustrates how some courts look with disfavor upon those
activities of public agencies which make it difficult for plaintiffs to
serve process. This case involved a motion to give effect to a notice
of claim filed a day late upon the defendant. The plaintiff alleged
that the notice was timely since, on the last day allowed for filing,
her attorney attempted service by going to the only address listed
for the defendant in the telephone directory.87  When he arrived
he was directed to an attorney for the Authority whose office was
located in an adjoining building. There, upon making his intentions
known to the guard in the lobby, he was told that the Authority's
attorney had left, and that no one else would accept the notice.
When he requested permission to go up to the office of the defend-
ant's attorney, his request was refused, and he was advised to go
to the defendant's claims department across town. By the time
85 Sellars v. Raye, 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 758-59, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10-11
(2d Dep't 1966); Dobkin v. Chapman, supra note 83, at 747-49, 269 N.Y.S.2d
at 52-54.
86 49 Misc. 2d 704, 268 N.Y.S2d 519 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965).
87 CPLR 311 provides rules for service upon corporations. Since the
defendant was a public corporation for which service is not specifically
provided by CPLR 311(2)-(7), CPLR 311(1) was held to apply. Ac-
cordingly, service upon an officer, director, managing or general agent would
be sufficient.
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he arrived there, the claims department was closed for the day.
The notice was served the next day.
The court held that under these facts it would treat the notice
of claim as timely filed "on the familiar principle that equity treats
that as done which ought to have been done." 88 The court stated
that it would not permit building employees to interfere with the
normal service of process-"if papers are tendered at an office by
an attorney, and he is prevented from effectuating such service, this
court will treat such papers as duly served. .... I'll
The defendant claimed that the Authority had published a
notice in the New York Law Journal that notices of claim were to
be filed at the claims department. The court answered that "re-
spondent should not be heard to assert that, hidden somewhere,
perhaps on a musty library shelf, under a date which is not given,
is a copy of an issue of the New York Law Journal which states
.. .[where] papers should be served. . .. ". " 9
Although the court does not expressly so state, a species of
estoppel appears to be the basis of its holding, i.e., the defendant
acted in such a way so as to cause the plaintiff to act in reliance
thereupon, to her detriment. The fact that the court cited two
cases unrelated to service of process, but dealing with situations
wherein a litigant was estopped from asserting a claim or defense D'
adds weight to this view.
The holding in the instant case receives some support from the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Teresta v. City of New York.9 2
In that case, the plaintiff had improperly filed a notice of claim.
The defendant, despite the improper notice, summoned the plaintiff
for an examination of the merits of his claim. Only later did the
defendant raise an objection to the method of service. Under these
facts the Court of Appeals found elements of estoppel and held that
the requirement of proper filing had been waived. The Court stated
that "neither legal theory nor public policy stands in the way of
[such] a waiver. . .. ,, 3
It seems, therefore, that the Court of Appeals favors the view
that both waiver and estoppel may operate to preclude a public
88 Ware v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority,
49 Misc. 2d 704, 706, 268 N.Y.S2d 519, 522 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1965).
89 Ibid.
DO Ibid.
91 The court cited Triple Cities Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
4 N.Y.2d 443, 151 N.E.2d 856, 176 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1958), and Romano v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271 N.Y. 288, 292 N.E2d 661 (1936), neither
of which was concerned with service of process within a permissible time
period.
92 304 N.Y. 440, 108 N.E.2d 397 (1952).
9 3 Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397,
398 (1952).
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authority from .relying on a defense of *failure to file properly a
notice of claim.
ARTICLE: 6- JOINDER OF CLAIMs, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 603: Court grants separate trial for severable issues.
Pursuant to CPLR 603, a trial court may on its own motion
sever the issues in an action, and order a separate trial of any
claim or of any separate issue for convenience or to avoid prejudice.
In Hacker v. City of New York," the appellate division, first
department, in interpreting CPLR 603, explained and expanded the
procedure of granting separate trials of severable issues. In Hacker,
an action for personal injuries, the parties stipulated that the issue
of liability be tried by the court without a jury, in advance of the
issue of damages. Having found for the plaintiff on the issue of
liability, the court ordered the trial of damages to be placed on the
calendar. The City then appealed and moved for a stay of the trial
of damages pending this appeal. The instant court, in a un'ani-
mous opinion, held that defendant was entitled to appeal from the
judgment on the separate issue of liability, and granted a stay of the
trial of damages.
This decision was contrary to Bliss v. Londner,9s wherein the
second department held that although separate trials on the issues'
of liability and damages were proper, a finding on the liability issue
was merely a ruling in the course of the trial, and an appeal from
such a ruling must await the entry of a judgment. The instant
court called the Bliss decision irrelevant because "we do not have
in this case . 'one continuous proceeding' in which the issues
of liability and damages proceed to determination together. ...
The court compared the appeal allowed here with an appeal from
an order granting stummary judgment and directing a=i assessment
of damages.
ARTICLE 10- PARTIES GENERALLY
Vouching in: Available where party sought to, be vouched in is-
the defendant's indemnitor.
Vouching in, the common-law ancestor of impleader, 9 is used
today in cases where impleader cannot be used.98 The defendant,
9425 App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1966).
9520 App. Div. 2d 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d. 296 (2d Dep't 1964).96 Hiacker v. City of New York, 25 App., Div. 2d 35, 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d
194, 196 '(1st Dep't 1966).
97 CPLR 1007.
98 For example, impleader cannot be used where the third person is not
subject :to the jurisdiction of the court in which the defendant has been
sued.
[ VOL. 41
